

Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100040001-2

Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100040001-2

Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: 26 Oct 49

To: D/NE

From: Staff Intelligence Division, Projects Planning

Subject: Information on Afghanistan

Statement of Project

Origin: Special

Problem: To provide certain specified information of Afghanistan

Scope: The following information is requested:

1. With respect to the government:
  - a. Stability of the regime
  - b. Top officials (names, attitudes toward US and USSR, UK and UK)
2. With respect to the economy: condition and prospects
3. Evaluation of military strength
4. Foreign relations: with Pakistan and India
  - a. Describe any existing treaties.

Graphics (if any):

Form: Final draft of memo to be prepared by D/NE

Draft due in D/St: earliest convenience

(if any):

Responsible Branch: D/NE

Internal Coordination: None

Departmental responsibilities: None

Classification to be no higher than: Top Secret

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Afghanistan

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET  
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	<i>D/ Pub.</i>		
2			
3			
4			
5			

FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	<i>D/ ne.</i>		
2			
3			

<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE
<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE

REMARKS:

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

IP-31

Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100040001-2

**CONFIDENTIAL**

25 October 1949

25X1A

MEMORANDUM FOR: 

SUBJECT : Information on Afganistan

1. It is requested that latest information be furnished on Afganistan.

a. Names of top officials of the country.

(1) Their attitudes as vis a vis the US, UK, and USSR.


(2) Stability of the regime.

b. State of the economy

c. Evaluation of military strength.

d. Relations with Pakistan and India. (Inc. any existing treaties)

25X1A



REL  
D/Pub  
(Please return  
this letter to D/Pub)

Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100040001-2

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Reference: Case No. 480

G/SI

1949 DEC 16 15 07

Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100040001-2

Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100040001-2

CONFIDENTIAL

Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: 28 Oct 49

To: D/NE

From: Staff Intelligence Division, Projects Planning ~~Publications~~ REL

Subject: [REDACTED] document "OENO"  
STATSPEC

Statement of Project

Origin: Special

STATSPEC

Problem: To provide all available information on [REDACTED] document OENO

Scope: The description of this document is contained in the attached memorandum

Graphics (if any):

Form: Memorandum

Draft due in D/St: earliest convenience

Dissemination deadline  
(if any):

Responsible Branch: D/NE

Internal Coordination: None, possibly D/EE (Int. communism group)

Departmental responsibilities: None

Classification to be no higher than: Secret

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

CONFIDENTIAL



1. DENO

2. Greece - Merchant marine

3. Communism - Greece

ROUTING

25X1A



**CONFIDENTIAL**

classification by D/Pub

27 October 1949

25X1A

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

STATSPEC

SUBJECT : [REDACTED] Document "OENO"

STATSPEC

1. Have you any information on the following document which [REDACTED] recently said has been written and released in Athens?

2. It is called, "OENO - The Satanic Organization of the Greek Communist Party within the Mercantile (Merchant?) Marine," written by Kaufoudakis, former general secretary, OENO.

25X1A

Reference: Case No. 456

ISO/[REDACTED]/rmj

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RESTRICTED

AD/ORE

Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: 28 Oct 49

To: D/Tr

From: Staff Intelligence Division, Projects Planning (EC)  
Publications

Subject: Information on certain airlines, in Southeast Asia

Statement of Project

Origin: Special

Problem: To provide all available information on specified air lines.

Scope: Information requested on

(1) United Air Lines, Burma

(2) An unidentifiable airline reputedly operating in  
Indonesia, [REDACTED] STATOTHR

Information should include ownership, management, organization,  
financial condition, operation, etc.

Graphics (if any):

Form: Memorandum, the final draft of which is to be prepared by D/Tr

Draft due in D/St: earliest convenience

Dissemination deadline  
(if any):

Responsible Branch: D/Tr

Internal Coordination: D/FE

Departmental responsibilities: None

Classification to be no higher than: Secret

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

OCT 28 1949  
AD-32

RESTRICTED

ROUTING


25X1A

~~1.~~

~~2.~~

~~3.~~

4.



**RESTRICTED**

25 October 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, G/SI

SUBJECT : Request for information on (1) United Air Lines, Burma, (2) Air line, name unknown, Indonesia, [REDACTED]

STATOTHR [REDACTED] (Case #491)

STATOTHR [REDACTED]

1. Information is requested on United Air Lines operating in Burma concerning equipment, personnel and schedules.

2. Information is similarly requested on an unidentifiable airline reputedly operating in Indonesia,

STATOTHR [REDACTED]

25X1A [REDACTED]

REL  
D/RB  
Please return this  
memo to D/RB

**RESTRICTED**

RESTRICTED

Chief, Publications Division,  
Projects Planning  
Chief, Transportation Division

3 November, 19

Information on certain airlines in Southeast Asia.

The following information is submitted on Project IP-33.

(1) United Airlines, Burma: Transportation Division has no information on United Airlines but has the following on United Airways.

United Airways in June 1949, was said to be chartered to Union of Burma Airways (UBA). UBA, the government-owned airline, had started operations in Burma in September 1943 with six De Havilland Doves of which three were out of commission by June 1949. United Airways (formerly Peacock Airways), operating with American and British pilots had one C-46 and one PB1 chartered to UBA.

STATOTHR

STATOTHR

The line was said to have inaugurated services in September 1949. In August 1949 Indonesian Airways was operating two C-47's on charter for the Burmese Government, inside Burma, and was said to have had a third C-47 being overhauled in Hong Kong.

25X1A

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

**FROM:** 25X1A  
[REDACTED] - 249 South

ACCESSION NO.  
*R-11933*  
 DATE RECEIVED IN S. A.  
*26 Oct.*

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. Chief, G/SI	<i>2516</i> <i>PM</i>	<i>27 Oct</i>	<i>28 Oct</i>	<i>RJS/o</i>	
<span style="background-color: black; color: black;">[REDACTED]</span>				<i>REL</i>	
25X1A					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

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AD/ORE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: 31 Oct 49

To: D/Tr

From: ~~STATE DIVISION~~ Intelligence Division, Projects Planning *REL*

Subject: Iranian rail facilities

Statement of Project

Origin: Special

Problem: To provide statistics on Iranian rail facilities

Scope: Requester wants:

- (a) Maximum tonnage per day on Iranian State Railroad between AHWAZ and TEHRAN during lend-lease peak of World War II
- (b) Current or latest tonnage figures  
(Include petroleum products)

Graphics (if any):

Form: Final draft of memo to be prepared by D/Tr

Draft due in D/St: by 9 November

Dissemination deadline  
(if any): 10 November

Responsible Branch: D/Tr

Internal Coordination: D/NE

Departmental responsibilities: None

Classification to be no higher than: Secret

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

CONFIDENTIAL

*l. R. H.*  
NOV 3 1949  
300-3

ROUTING

25X1A



**CONFIDENTIAL**

*File*

*Rec'd 10 Nov 1949*  
Chief, Publications Division  
Projects Planning  
Chief, Transportation Division, ORE  
Iranian Rail Facilities (IP-34)

10 November 1949

1. In response to subject request of 31 October 1949, the following information is submitted:

- (a) Maximum tonnage per day on Iranian State Railways between Ahwas and Tehran during lend-lease peak of World War II.

During the last two months of 1943, an average of 6,700 short tons of freight per day was carried northbound. This was the most sustained peak tonnage carried. However, for a short time, a peak of 8,000 short tons per day was carried northbound between Ahwas and Tehran. In each case, add 20 percent for tonnage moving southbound.

- (b) Current or latest tonnage figures (include petroleum products):

According to the Annual Railway Report of US Embassy Tehran, dated 14 September 1949 (CIA No. 352709), the Iranian State Railways are now able to carry only about 2,000 metric tons of commercial goods per day on the South-North route between Ahwas and Tehran. The report further states that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company requires to be transported about 45,000 tons of POL products per month from Ahwas to Tehran. POL thus would take up over two-thirds of the railway's capacity if the ISR were able to supply the service. It is estimated that approximately 100,000 tons of sugar and 100,000 tons of wheat must be transported during the coming year, although some of this will move by road.


Iranian State Railway officials have stated that they are able to carry 4,000 tons per day. This figure might be true if it represented the weight of the cars and cargo, but it is generally agreed that a maximum of 2,000 tons of cargo per day can be moved between Ahwas and Tehran.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

2. While bids have been invited on new railway equipment estimated to cost 15-20 million dollars, it will be some time before it will be available. It is doubtful, furthermore, that this amount of equipment will be sufficient to enable the Iranian State Railroad to cope with its traffic demands. The ISR has acquired almost no new equipment since the end of the war. Depreciation has been extensive, while the volume of peacetime traffic has grown steadily. The ISR has been less and less able to meet the demands of the South-North traffic. The country is faced with a grave transportation problem unless the system can acquire new rolling stock in the immediate future and increase its operating efficiency.

25X1A



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**CONFIDENTIAL**

28 October 1949


MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, G/SI

SUBJECT : Request for Basic Intelligence Information  
Concerning Iranian Rail Facilities

1. It is requested that this office be provided with the best available statistics showing the maximum tonnage hauled per day by the Iranian State Railroad between AHWAZ and TEHRAN during the lend-lease peak of World War II, and also the current or latest tonnage figures including petroleum products.

2. The above material is requested as soon as practicable or by 10 November 1949, if possible.


25X1A



REL  
2/9/50  
Please return memo  
to D/9/50.

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Project: IP-33 OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: 2 Nov 49

To: D/EE

From: Publications  
State Intelligence Division, Projects Planning REC  
XXXXXXXXXXXX

Subject: "Green International" in Poland

Statement of Project

Origin:

Problem: To furnish any available information on "Green International" an underground movement in Poland

Scope:

Ltr. attached.

Presumably requester would want to know of Polish segment's connections with the movement in other EE countries, and with the "exiled core" of the movement in Washington, as well as the operation, organization, connections of the movement in Poland.

Graphics (if any):

Form: Final draft of memorandum to be prepared by D/EE

Draft due in D/St: 4 November

Dissemination deadline  
(if any): 7 November

Responsible Branch: D/EE

Internal Coordination: None

Departmental responsibilities: None

Classification to be no higher than: Top Secret

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

1. Green international
2. Poland - ~~Resistance~~ - Pol. & govt.
3. Resistance - Poland

ROUTING

25X1A



3 November 1949


IP-35

**SUBJECT:** Relationship between the Underground Movement in Poland and the "Green International" Organization.

No information is available on any underground movement inside Poland called the "Green International." Furthermore, it is not believed that an underground movement bearing this name exists in Poland. The "Green International" is the name applied to a non-Communist, Agrarian, refugee organization in the United States.

A nationwide underground movement exists in Poland divided into Western, Southern, and Warsaw Sections. The three sections have neither close nor satisfactory liaison with each other. They are almost entirely passive and are engaged in (1) studies of the moves and methods of the UB (Secret State Security Police), and (2) planning for rapid mobilization of opposition in the event of war.

The Western Section is based on the triangle formed by the cities of Bydgoszcz, Torun, and Grudziadz, an area northwest of Warsaw and due south of Gdansk. Of the three sections the Western is believed to be the best organized and largest, but it does not correlate its activities with the Warsaw section, of which it is suspicious. Furthermore, in the event of hostilities, the Western Section is believed capable of effective operation for some time since it has caches of arms in the area.



**TOP SECRET**

No additional information is available on the Southern and Warsaw Sections.

In general, the Polish underground movement possesses some media of communication with the West and with the other satellites. Membership in the entire movement is not precisely known but numbers in the thousands.

The organization known as the "Green International" (officially the International Peasants Union) is a refugee organization formed in the United States in June 1948 by a group of former outstanding Eastern European Agrarian political leaders. This group includes G. M. Dimitrov, former leader of the Bulgarian Peasant Party; Ferenc Nagy, former leader of the Hungarian Smallholders Party; Vladko Macek, former President of the Croatian Peasant Party in Yugoslavia; Milan Gavrilovic, former President of the Serbian Peasant Party in Yugoslavia; Gregori N. Buzesti, former member of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Peasant Party; and Stanislaw Miklosajczyk, former leader of the Polish Peasant Party. It is quite probable that the "Green International" has contact with underground movements in Eastern Europe.

In the particular case of Poland, since [REDACTED] is believed to have con- 25X1C  
tact with the Western section of the Polish underground movement, there is at least some indirect connection between the "Green International" and the Polish underground. However, this does not indicate that the Polish underground movement is an adjunct of the "Green International" or is a "Green International" underground movement.

**TOP SECRET**

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MEMO FOR RJS:

Subject: IP-36.

We anticipated some difficulties on this, and attempted to iron them out before the work was undertaken. I have read the reports included in this response to the request, and I think they will be just what the requester had in mind; that on Burma is perhaps a little too detailed, but then, Burma is a pretty confusing problem. As for [REDACTED] 25X1A

25X1A [REDACTED] concern about the speculative nature of the reports, if for "speculation" you read "estimate", I believe we have produced exactly what was wanted. Beyond that, while I cannot claim to know what may be in their other publications, I doubt that this material could have been

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requirement. I think D/FE has correctly referenced certain published materials, a practice which should be encouraged in these OPC projects.

25X1A [REDACTED] has assured me that the project itself is of the highest importance, and 'way up on their list. I have asked him to drop by 25X1A and reassure [REDACTED] on that point.

Meanwhile, the WE contribution has come in and the whole job is now ready for delivery to OPC tomorrow.

15 Dec 49

REL



TRANSMITTAL			IP
			<u>12/15</u> DATE
TO: <u>REL</u>			
BUILDING		ROOM NO.	
REMARKS: <u>Have held</u> <u>this for your</u> <u>interest. John</u> <u>thinks you should</u> <u>check with FE (not</u> <u>comment) and (over)</u>			
FROM:			
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION	
FORM NO. 36-8 SEP 1946			

25X1A

OPC shared. He  
asked to see

 *or*  
Suggested -

Did FE do  
more than was  
required? *or*  
was project too  
extensive?

25X1A

*Reliving up  
to him*

Date 13 December 1949

PUBLICATIONS DIVISION  
MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, ~~STATE INTELLIGENCE GROUP~~

SUBJECT: Transmission of Draft Report.

ENCLOSURE: IP-36 Resistance and Guerrilla Movements in Indochina, Thailand, Malaya and Burma

REF: D/Pub. ltr. of same enc. subj., dated 2 November 1949

1. Enclosure is hereby forwarded for review and subsequent formal coordination with the departmental intelligence organizations.

2. This draft report has been coordinated informally with the organizations checked below:

Within ORE

Branches

Western Europe  
Eastern Europe/USSR  
Near East/Africa  
Far East/Pacific  
Northern  
Latin America


Groups

Global Survey  
Economics Group  
International Orgs.  
Transportation


Outside ORE

State (OIR)  
Army (ID/GSUSA)  
Navy (ONI)  
Air (D/IAF)


3. Maps to be included in this report and arrangements for their production by the Map Branch are as follows:

None required

4. Comments:

No coordination required

25X1A

25X1A

To: [REDACTED]

Although we have complied with requirements in writing this paper, it is so speculative in nature that I question the wisdom of putting it in writing. The substantive material is all covered in previous publications; therefore it seems to me that OPC would obtain greater advantage if the speculative portion were discussed with us after the basic publications had been thoroughly digested.

25X1A

TRANSMITTAL IP		
15 Dec 1946 DATE		
TO: RTS		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	
REMARKS: Note on this IP is addressed to you. Also read memo. Delivery is due today. comment? checked by [redacted] O PC		
FROM:	[redacted]	
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8  
SEP 1946

25X1A

25X1A

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*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : [REDACTED] 25X1A

DATE: 13 December 1940

FROM : Southern Branch

SUBJECT: IP-36

This project has required many man-hours of initial preparation, review and typing. It is hoped that OPC is justified in requesting a report so speculative in nature and burden-some in proportions.

LSM

15-36

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		
31 Oct 49		
DATE		
TO:		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	
REMARKS:		
<p>① ON SEA countries, IM-250 (which is similar in intent) is silent; on WE countries, IM-250 will <u>generally</u> cover what is wanted, except on point e.</p> <p>② If specific info is wanted in c &amp; d, B/FE may provide; B/WE will renege.</p> <p>③ It is assumed question is one of <u>anti-communist</u> resistance rather than <u>anti-Algeria</u> - is this so?</p>		
FROM:		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8  
SEP 1946

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		
25X1A	28 Oct 49	
DATE		
TO:		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	
REMARKS:		
<p>Please check back on this in an effort to reduce the "generality" and scope.</p> <p>I would like to talk with you before you talk to the Division.</p>		
FROM:		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION

SECRET

Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: 2 Nov 49

To: D/FE, D/WE

Publications

From: Staff Intelligence Division, Projects Planning REL

Subject: Resistance and guerrilla movements in certain countries

Statement of Project

Origin:

Problem: To give the latest available information on resistance and guerrilla movements in each of certain countries

Scope: Countries:

Belgium  
Netherlands

Burma  
Thailand  
Malaya  
Indo-China

Specific points: as listed in attached memo.

Note that more detail is requested, if available, than in IM-250, which this remotely resembles

Note also that sub.para. a thru d refer to anti-Soviet resistance movements, and sub-para. e refers to present

Graphics (if any): Communist activities. Sub.para. a thru d are based on an assumption of communist control of the countries in question; sub-para. e is based on a continuance of Western control.

Form:

Draft due in D/St:  
15 December

Dissemination deadline  
(if any): 15 December

Responsible Branch: D/FE and D/WE

Internal Coordination: D/FE with D/WE on colonial territories  
with D/No

Departmental responsibilities: None

Classification to be no higher than: Top Secret

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only


SECRET

1. Resistance - Belgium
2. Resistance - Netherlands
3. Resistance - Southeast Asia
4. Southeast Asia
5. Belgium
6. Netherlands



ROUTING

25X1A



**SECRET**

28 October 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Request for Current Intelligence Information on Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Indo-China, Belgium and the Netherlands.

1. This office has an urgent requirement for current intelligence on each of the above mentioned countries to include the following specific points:

a. Political situation, including the attitude of the people, as it might affect the establishment of resistance movements and stay-behind activities.

b. Capacity of the country to support logistically such resistance movements.

c. Existing plans for resistance movements and stay behind activities.

d. Present and potential leaders for resistance movements and stay behind activities.

e. Communist activities of a guerrilla nature within the country at present and their capabilities along such lines in the future, to include feasible communist courses of action.

2. It is further requested that your office prepare a resume or history of World War II resistance movements in each country.

3. It is requested that the requirement in paragraph 1 be completed by 27 November, and the requirement in paragraph 2 be completed by 24 December 1949.

25X1A

Chief, Special Liaison Section

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

*6 copies  
in file space*

28 October 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Request for Current Intelligence  
Information on Burma, Thailand,  
Malaya, Indo-China, Belgium and  
the Netherlands.

1. This office has a <sup>✓</sup>urgent requirement for current intelligence on each of the above mentioned countries to include the following specific points:

- a. Political situation, including the attitude of the people, as it might affect the establishment of resistance movements and stay-behind activities.
- b. Capacity of the country to support logistically such resistance movements.
- c. Existing plans for resistance movements and stay behind activities.
- d. Present and potential leaders for resistance movements and stay behind activities.
- e. Communist activities of a guerrilla nature within the country at present and their capabilities along such lines in the future, to include feasible communist courses of action.

~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**

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*OPC agrees to send  
this information  
RIS*

2. It is further requested that your office <sup>*prepare*</sup> ~~initiate~~  
a resume or history, of World War II resistance movements  
in each country.

3. It is requested that the requirement in paragraph 1  
be completed by 27 November, and the requirement in para-  
graph 2 <sup>*be*</sup> completed by 24 December 1949.

25X1A

*(* Chief, Special Liaison Section

*deadline may be extended to  
six weeks from date.*

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**SECRET**

**SECRET**

Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100040001-2

Project: IP-36

15 December 1949

Resistance and Guerrilla Movements in Belgium and Netherlands

Although the current political situation in Belgium and the Netherlands has little bearing on possible Communist control of those countries, except in very general terms, a brief political estimate is provided below in order to give the other points discussed a proper perspective. There is almost no information on existing plans for anti-Communist resistance movements and stay behind activities in Belgium and the Netherlands, but it is believed that few if any provisions have been made for resistance in the event of a Soviet occupation. There are no communist "guerrilla" movements in Belgium and the Netherlands, and the discussion on the question of communist activities is restricted to an estimate of their present and future capabilities and probable future courses of action. Because the request, as applied to Belgium and the Netherlands, pertains almost entirely to future developments, the discussion takes the form of estimates rather than information.

Belgium

- a. Political situation, including the attitude of the Belgian people, as it might affect the establishment of resistance movements and stay behind activities.

The current political situation is rather turbulent for Belgium, with the question of King Leopold's return providing the main issue of controversy. Parliament passed a law in 1945, which confirmed the regency of Prince Charles and made it impossible for King Leopold—released from the Germans in May 1945, and now residing in Switzerland,—to resume his royal functions without the approval of Parliament. The national elections held in June 1949 showed gains for the Catholics and Liberals and losses for the Socialists and Communists. The Communist Party's support dropped from 12.5% of the popular vote in 1946 to 7.5%. A definite shift to the right was most clearly illustrated by the large Liberal gains. The Catholics achieved a bare majority in the Senate but lack two seats of a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The present Catholic-Liberal Government, formed in August 1949 after considerable difficulty, replaced the Catholic-Socialist Government which had been in power since March 1947. The Catholic Party made important concessions to the economic laissez-faire of the Liberals, and the latter received eight out of the seventeen portfolios, a proportion not justified by their parliamentary strength. In exchange, the Liberal Ministers evidently indicated their support of Catholic efforts to obtain the return of King Leopold.

A recent Catholic proposal for a "popular consultation" (designed to measure public sentiment on whether King Leopold should return) may receive parliamentary approval the first of next year. A national vote

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on this issue probably will then be held in February or March, 1950. The Socialists are currently using every possible parliamentary tactic to delay approval as long as possible. The importance of the controversy over King Leopold lies largely in: 1) the enmity between Catholics and Socialists over the issue, which prevented Socialist participation in the present Government; 2) the division of political parties and of the pro-Leopold Flemings and anti-Leopold Walloons over the King, who is supposed to represent a unifying force above linguistic, social, and political differences; 3) the effect the issue has of solidifying the position of the Socialists as a strong parliamentary opposition force; 4) the delay in decisions on important economic problems while the royal question demands the attention of the Government; and 5) the opportunity it may provide the Communists, if Leopold returns, of obtaining the support of Socialist workers for political protest strikes.

The Catholic-Liberal Government cannot be considered a stable one, not only because of opposition among Liberal Party members to Leopold, but also because of divergent approaches to economic and social problems. Another Catholic-liberal Government is likely, however, if the present coalition falls in the near future. If the Cabinet is unable to find a solution to the royal question or if economic difficulties reach crisis proportions, a tripartite Government is possible. Eventually a Catholic-Socialist coalition seems likely.

Under Communist control (which could result only from a successful invasion by Soviet Armed Forces) it is probable that the Governmental organs would be under complete Soviet military domination, with the Belgian Communists entrusted with only minor operational functions and the ferreting out of dangerous anti-Communist elements. Although the present top Government and political figures would either escape or be liquidated by the Soviets, the lesser Government officials probably would remain at their posts, when permitted to by the Soviets, and would perform their minimum functions, attempting to make the task of controlling the country as difficult as possible for the occupying forces.

In spite of the strong antipathy for the Communists and the USSR of most of the Belgian population, the elements sufficiently hostile toward the USSR to constitute a potential underground, would, in the event of a Soviet invasion, initially be very small. A feeling of national and individual helplessness would prevent strong resistance movements from being formed or effectively utilized. Political differences among the non-Communist parties, including the dispute over King Leopold, would not prevent cooperation among them, although the Catholic and Liberal Parties members may tend to exclude extreme left-wing Socialists from their resistance activities, fearing fellow-traveler sentiments among them. The Belgians would, on a local and isolated basis, form small resistance groups and carry out minor resistance activities. The division between Walloons and Flemings in most phases of Belgian life would be evident in resistance movements to the extent that each group would operate in its own area, but this in itself would not prevent the formation of a national resistance movement.

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b. Capacity of Belgium to support logistically such resistance movements.

Belgium would not be able logistically to lend much support to illegal groups for resistance activities for the following reasons: 1) The terrain, except for the low hills and woods of the Ardennes in the southeast portion of the country would not provide protection for small illegal groups; 2) the small size of the country; 3) the dependence on imports, especially for food; 4) the difficulty of obtaining and concealing weapons; 5) the density of the population, making very difficult the gathering of groups of any size without being detected. Because of the dense population, the concealment of individuals would not be too difficult, however, and the practice of many urban workers to live on and work their own land, would facilitate the hiding and feeding of persons throughout the country. Assuming the UK remains unoccupied, some smuggling of persons and supplies across the English Channel would be possible. Generally, Belgium, as in World War II, would be able to support only a small resistance movement organized largely to transmit information to free allied areas and to provide assistance to liberating forces.

c. Existing plans for resistance movements and stay behind activities.

No such plans are known to exist, and although it may be assumed that there may be tentative Governmental preparations and some among unofficial groups, their value and importance are believed to be negligible.

d. Present and potential leaders for resistance movements and stay behind activities.

There are at present no known active anti-Communist resistance organizations or leaders. The potential leaders would be drawn largely from the upper class, and the majority probably would be Catholics, making use of the Church organization and communications to reach their potential following. Some non-Communist trade unionists, if able to escape Communist identification, would also probably provide leadership. Any efforts of members of the Socialist unions to lead resistance activities would be very difficult, however, because Communist elements within the unions could quickly expose them. Members of the Gendarmerie and counter-intelligence organizations of the Government could also be expected to provide direction to resistance activities.

e. Communist activities of a guerrilla nature within the country at present and their capabilities along such lines in the future, to include feasible communist courses of action.

There are no current communist activities of a guerrilla nature in Belgium. Communist capabilities for action of a guerrilla nature are nil in the absence of outside support so strong as to constitute practically overt violation of Belgian sovereignty or in the absence of actual Soviet occupation. An official Belgian source (Secret/Control - U.S. Officials only) estimated in September 1949 that the Belgian Communist Party and

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its front organizations have less than 1,000 men who could be counted on for acts of violence. The actual figure may be slightly higher, but in view of the efficiency of the Belgian security forces and the rapid retaliation against any group attempting an uprising or serious sabotage, Communist activities of this kind would receive very little support from the majority of the Communist Party members. It is not believed that the Communists have at their disposal sufficient arms and supplies for any kind of military action.

Communist capabilities for acts of violence are not expected to improve without outside assistance. If Belgian plans for increasing the effectiveness of its Armed Forces under the Atlantic Pact are implemented, the presence of efficient Army units to support the internal security forces in case of an emergency, probably would decrease further the enthusiasm militant Communists may have for any kind of suicide action. Under these circumstances, it is extremely doubtful that the Communists would engage in illegal military activities, and if ordered to do so by the USAR, the response would be negligible.

#### Netherlands

- a. Political situation, including the attitude of the Dutch people, as it might affect the establishment of resistance movements and stay behind activities.

Efforts to prevent loss of Dutch control over Indonesia has dominated the political situation since the end of the war. Even with a peaceful settlement at hand, the problem of maintaining maximum Dutch political influence and economic interests in Indonesia will be a major political issue for some time to come. The special elections held in July 1948 to enable the formation of a Government with sufficient political support to deal effectively with the Indonesian problem resulted in the formation of a coalition Government, which still is in power. It includes two small right-of-center parties, the Party for Freedom and Democracy and the Christian Historical Union, as well as the Catholic and Labor parties, the largest and second largest political groups. The inclusion of the two minor parties was necessary in order for the Government to command a two-thirds parliamentary majority to obtain approval of the constitutional measures affecting the Netherlands' relationship with Indonesia. With the achievement of this aim, probably within the next week, the coalition Government is expected to show increasing signs of dissension among its four parties over domestic economic and social policies, but no immediate changes in its composition are expected. While Catholic-Labor differences have been aired recently in the press, the cooperation between the two major parties, although less harmonious, probably will continue for some time. The withdrawal of one or both of the minor parties, which have only one Cabinet post each, will not materially decrease Government stability and may even facilitate Cabinet decisions on domestic issues.

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The Communist Party has never participated in the Government, even in the immediate postwar period, and the decline in its support from 10.6% of the total vote in 1946 to 7.7% in 1948 would probably be further accentuated if elections were held now. Politically, the Communist Party has but a minor nuisance value in opposing the Government in all phases of its domestic and foreign policies.

"Communist" control in the Netherlands would be the same as in Belgium in that it would actually be Soviet military control, but with even less support from a small group of Dutch Communists than would be the case in Belgium.

Although the Netherlands people are strongly anti-Communist and generally are repelled by what Communism and the USSR represent, in the event of a Soviet invasion, only a small minority is sufficiently hostile toward the USSR to attempt active resistance initially, because it would mean almost certain annihilation. A feeling of futility would prevent strong resistance movements from being formed immediately or from being effectively utilized, but passive resistance and non-cooperation would be nation-wide. Political differences among the non-Communist parties would not prevent cooperation among them, and resistance efforts would be carried out on a non-political, but for some time, local and uncoordinated basis.

- b. Capacity of the Netherlands to support logistically such resistance movements:

The Netherlands is ill-suited to support logistically illegal groups for resistance activities for very much the same reasons that Belgium is. The Netherlands terrain provides even less protection for resistance groups than that of Belgium, with only some woodlands in the eastern and northern areas of the country providing any semblance of protective cover. The Netherlands agricultural production is larger than that of Belgium, but the specialized nature of agricultural products, designed to a large extent for export, and a larger population, would cause about the same problem of food supplies for clandestine groups as in Belgium. The Netherlands would, therefore, be able to support only a small resistance movement organized largely to transmit information to free allied areas and to provide assistance to liberating forces, but resistance elements would probably be able to accomplish this more effectively than similar groups in Belgium.

- c. Existing plans for resistance movements and stay behind activities:

No such plans are known to exist, and although it may be assumed that there are tentative Governmental preparations and some among unofficial groups, their value and importance are believed to be negligible.

- d. Present and potential leaders for resistance movements and stay behind activities:

There are at present no known active anti-Communist resistance

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organizations or leaders. The potential leaders would be drawn largely from the upper class, and Catholic and Calvinist groups probably would serve as rallying points for some resistance because of the strong position of the Catholic and Calvinist Churches in the country. Some non-Communist trade unionists would also probably provide leadership and would be better able to escape Communist identification than their Belgian counterparts because the Communists are fairly well isolated from the non-Communist trade union movement. Members of the internal security police and counter-intelligence organizations of the Government could also be expected to provide directions to resistance activities.

- e. Communist activities of a guerrilla nature within the country at present and their capabilities along such lines in the future, to include feasible communist courses of action.

Communist capabilities in the Netherlands are even more limited than in Belgium. Because their trade union support is less and the Dutch security forces are more efficient, the Dutch Communists would find even minor sabotage more difficult and dangerous. The capabilities of the Communists for acts of violence will continue to decrease, and their weakness probably will prevent any course of action that calls for open revolt or widespread sabotage.

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RESISTANCE AND GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS IN MALAYA

GENERAL

For a detailed narrative of Malaya's resistance movement during World War II, attention is invited to the recently published The Jungle Is Neutral, by F. Spencer Chapman. This factual account of stay behind activities is invaluable when considering the feasibility of developing an effective resistance movement in Malaya.

1. Possible sources of resistance

When considering the possibilities for the development of a resistance movement to a Communist Government in Malaya, it must first be pointed out that such a government would be controlled by Chinese and subservient to China. Under these circumstances it seems likely that a large majority of Malaya's Chinese, who constitute over forty per cent of the total population, would acquiesce to, if not cooperate with, the Communist authorities. Most of those Chinese who might form the nucleus for resistance activities are quite probably well-known to the Communist guerrillas who are now conducting a terrorist campaign in Malaya, and it may be expected that they will either evacuate or be liquidated in the event the Communists assume power. The political complexion of even the most rabidly anti-Communist Chinese can change overnight, provided enough political and economic pressure is brought to bear, and the chances for effective resistance from Malaya's Chinese are slight, at least during the early period of Communist control.

Essentially the same may be said of Malaya's Indians, who form about fourteen per cent of the population. Most of them are Tamil laborers. The capable leaders of the Indian community, if they found it unhealthy to live under Communist rule, would probably return to India rather than participate in guerrilla warfare.

This leaves only two groups -- the Malays, who barely outnumber the Chinese,

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and the British, who are now the controlling authority in Malaya.

There is a great deal of racial animosity between the Malays and the Chinese which has on occasion erupted into violence. The Malays fear the usurpation of their British-guaranteed rights by the economically and politically aggressive Chinese and thus look, perhaps reluctantly at times, to the British for continued protection. The Chinese, on the other hand, feel discriminated against by the British -- another reason they would not be a particularly fertile field for the cultivation of resistance activities. Despite their basic dislike of the Chinese, the Malays would not be especially useful unless they were competently organized and led; the common Malay has in the past demonstrated considerable apathy toward political developments and would, in any case, be under close surveillance by a (Chinese) Communist Government. Without outside leadership, Malay resistance would at best be sporadic and uncoordinated.

The British, with or without US assistance, might be able to develop a Malay movement of fairly serious proportions. There are those Englishmen with Burmese and Malayan jungle warfare experience who could provide ideal leadership. Since the beginning of the current emergency the British have established jungle warfare training schools which have been attended by both British and Malays. Therefore, the nucleus of well-trained cadre is already available. Such a group could capitalize on Malay dislike of the Chinese and might take advantage of any anti-Communist discontent among other elements.

## 2. Capacity to conduct resistance

Malaya's rugged terrain makes it in some respects an ideal country in which to conduct guerrilla activities. The mountains and jungle offer both a base for operations and a source of some food. A Malay-British resistance movement could expect some support in the form of food and shelter from peasant Malays and the aboriginal Sakai. Nevertheless, such a force, if effective operations were to be continued for a long period of time, would have to depend to a considerable

extent on sources outside Malaya for food, and almost entirely on outside aid for all other logistics such as light arms, light communications equipment and ammunition.

3. Plans for resistance

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No other information is available which would indicate the existence of a specific plan by any group for resistance to a Communist government.

4. Potential Leaders

Among the British now in Malaya -- the planters, tin mine employees, soldiers, and police -- there are probably many good potential leaders for stay behind work. Who they are, and which ones would be willing to undertake the task, is impossible to say at this time.

Similarly, there is at present no Chinese judged capable and willing to organize and lead a resistance movement. In the long run, as the results of Communist rule become apparent, Chinese resistance should not be discounted entirely. The Chinese, past masters in the art of intrigue, have an inordinate proclivity for secret societies which might eventually become the spark and rallying point for a serious resistance movement.

Among the Malays, Dato Onn bin Jaffar, the Prime Minister of the State of Johore and President of the United Malay Nationalist Organization (the most significant Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100040001-2

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a sincere nationalist with a large Malay following, and his capabilities far surpass those of any other Malay. These qualifications, of course, would put him high on the Communist list for removal. The various Sultans, who are also Malay religious leaders, may be able to mount some sort of resistance if the Communist regime interferes with their political or religious prerogatives. Here again, however, the fact that most of the Sultans are weak and incompetent makes effective leadership on their part a dubitable matter. The only other possibilities are the various prime ministers of the Malay states, but these are likely to follow the lead of Dato Onn rather than take the initiative.

5. Communist Activities

See (1) ORE 33-49, "The Current Situation in Malaya", (2) Chapman's book mentioned above, and (3) OIR Report #3480.57, "The Role of Communists in Current Disorders in Malaya", 3 Nov 1948.

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## RESISTANCE AND GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS IN BURMA.

GENERAL

For general background material relative to the subject, see ORE 35-48, 17 March 1949, "The Current Situation in Burma".

1. Possible sources of resistance

Should a Burmese Communist Government emerge in the near future, it would be opposed by a number of elements which the US could utilize in promoting resistance and guerrilla activities. In the order of their present importance, these elements may be classified as follows: 1) the Karens, the largest ethnic minority in Burma (supported by the Mons); 2) other ethnic minorities such as the Kachins, Chins and Shans who inhabit most of Burma's border areas, and; 3) various groups of Burmans which, for one reason or another would oppose a Communist regime. These groups may include elements of the Buddhist priesthood (pongyis) and their following, genuinely nationalistic or anti-Communist Burmans who support the present Government's efforts to suppress Communism, and various lawless bands which would be a source of unrest and instability regardless of the political orientation of any Government.

a. The Karens

There are between two and three million Karens in Burma, concentrated in southern Burma below the Prome-Toungoo axis. The eastern area, bordering upon Thailand from the Shan States to below Mergui in Tenasserim including Karen-i, is almost entirely inhabited by the Karens, although this mountainous region is sparsely populated. There are heavy concentrations of Karens in the area adjacent to Karen-i and in northern Tenasserim, where they outnumber the Burmans. The Karens and the Mons, who number a few hundred thousand and have much in common politically with the Karens, together probably outnumber the Burmans in the Tenasserim Division as a whole. About half of the Karens, however,

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live in the Irrawaddy Delta where they are highly intermingled with the Burmans who outnumber them by three or four to one.

Since January 1949, the Karens have been in open rebellion against the Burmese Government and have established an "independent" state in Eastern Burma, with administrative headquarters at Toungoo. Contrary to Burmese Government claims that only a small minority of "bad" Karens are participating in the Karens revolt, there is a mass of evidence that the Government does not believe its own propaganda and that an overwhelming majority of the Karens are either actively taking part in the fight or deeply in sympathy with it. Perhaps the most convincing indication of this attitude is the fact that all Karen military personnel, who constituted about one third of the Burmese Army and Military Police, either defected or were disarmed and interned by the Burmans, and their ranking officers (those who did not join the insurgent forces) were placed on indefinite leave.

To the Karens, their rebellion is not only a nationalistic movement, but also a struggle for survival. Aside from racial and linguistic differences there are more fundamental and deep-rooted reasons for Burman-Karen friction. Mutual animosity between the two people has existed for centuries. When the British withdrew, the Karens felt they would be discriminated against and suppressed while Burmans considered the Karens to be unduly influenced by the West and seeking a disproportionate share of governmental authority. As a result, violence was practically inevitable. The Karens in the past, have considered the British to be their protectors and the Americans to be their teachers as the result of extensive mission activities which were most successful among the Karens and have strongly influenced them. As a result, practically all the present Karen leaders are Christians of considerable intelligence and a better than average education. There is considerable evidence that these leaders have been aided by the US and UK to support their cause either directly or in the UK. There are no indications, however, that this

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disappointment has as yet turned to<sup>-3-</sup> disillusionment, and they appear to have adopted a philosophic and religious attitude that their cause is just and that right will eventually triumph over evil. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the Karens as a whole retain a strong pro-Western bias. This is illustrated by their repeated statements of attempting to establish a Government along the lines of Western democracy and desire for the closest political, economic and cultural relations with the Western powers. Needless to say, the Karens are anti-Communist if for no other reason than that they identify the Burmans with Communism. In fact, they even consider the present Burmese Government to be Communist. This attitude is clearly in contrast with the widespread appeal of Marxism among Burmans and their coolness, or hostility towards the West.

Another important consideration involves Karen relations with the Burmese Communists. The Karens, have on occasion, undertaken tactical cooperation with Communist forces against specific common objectives. However, such cooperation is the exception rather than the rule and there have been numerous bitter clashes between the two. Furthermore, there are indications that Communist agitators who have been caught in Karen-held territory have been summarily eliminated. For their part, the Burma Communist Party (BCP), the more important of Burma's two Communist parties, has proclaimed that the Karen rebellion must be smashed.

Although it is possible that some sort of settlement between the Burmese Government and the Karens may be arranged, the prospects for such a development are not bright, and even if it were consummated its effectiveness would be doubtful for a long time. Karen resistance to the Burmans, therefore, is likely to continue indefinitely and especially in the event of the emergence of a Communist Government. All things considered, the Karens offer an excellent opportunity for the development of an anti-Communist movement from a numerical, distribution, cultural, psychological, political and military point of view.

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b. Other Ethnic Minorities

Of the other ethnic minorities in Burma, the only ones worth mentioning in connection with possibly anti-Communist activities are the Kachins, Chins and Shans. Of these, the Shans are quite passive and apathetic and probably would be the least valuable. All these tribes are hill people and, are less sophisticated than the predominant Burmans. Their society is semi-feudal where in local chieftains exercise more or less autocratic authority and therefore tend to be conservative. With the inclusion of their territory into the Union of Burma after the British withdrawal, they shared the same apprehensions as did the Karens of a central Government which was predominantly Burman with strong leftist tendencies. Also, like the Karens, these people, have been influenced by American missionaries and the British. They are basically sympathetic to the West as was demonstrated in the late war when they, particularly the Kachins rendered signal services to the Allied forces advancing into Burma. Unlike the Karens, however, they are not highly mixed with Burmans, as there are very few Burmans living in the frontier areas. This is probably the reason that serious friction comparable to the Karen uprising has not developed. Since Burma became independent, frontier leaders have taken more and more administrative matters into their own hands as Burman authorities have been forced to concentrate their efforts in combating a variety of insurgents in lower Burma, and are now, to all intents and purposes, exercising autonomous powers. Any attempt of a Burman Government, not to mention a Communist Government, to impose its complete authority over the frontier area would almost certainly encounter stiff resistance.

There are indications of fairly extensive sympathy among these peoples for the Karens. Some Kachin military personnel have already defected and are now fighting with the Karens. Others have refused to battle the Karens, while still others have done so only reluctantly. The Chins have also shown similar tendencies.

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It would be a good bet that if a Communist Government were installed in Burma, or if any Burman Government attempted to dominate the frontier areas, these troops would desert. Such developments would also probably give impetus to an alliance or working agreement between the various ethnic minorities. The formation of a combined force, if effectively organized, led and supplied, could make matters extremely uncomfortable for any Government in Burma, Communist or otherwise.

c. Possibilities among Burmans

Although the foregoing may seem to indicate that it would be useless to attempt the development of anti-Communist resistance among Burmans, this is not necessarily so and there are a number of possibilities. The Burmans are extremely nationalistic, and at the present writing it is unlikely that the Burmese Communists will come to power by their own unaided efforts. (The only source of effective aid is from China.) A Burmese Communist Government would have great difficulty in concealing its dependence or subservience to China, and it is highly unlikely that most Burmans, including many of those now supporting the Communists, are in a mood to exchange one foreign authority for another. A Communist Government is bound to meet considerably Burman opposition, because aside from any ideological differences which may be involved, the Burman is volatile and extremely individualistic by nature, and has a strong tendency to suspect and resist all forms of Governmental authority. Burmese politics are also extremely fluid, and the Communists are quite likely to experience serious factionalism as personalities are often more important than policies. Therein lies the possibility of developing a vicious circle and snowballing resistance to the detriment of Communist control. Additional Chinese intervention would then be necessary, which could lead to further animosity towards the Chinese (which is already common among all the peoples in Burma) and Communists. Judicious assistance to resistance forces could conceivably keep the country in a constant

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state of unrest and instability unless the Chinese were prepared to occupy the country with overwhelming force.

It is impossible at the present juncture to point out specific groups which could be cultivated, and their emergence must be awaited. However, a few speculations may be fruitful. First, Burmans, are almost 100% Buddhists, and although the pongyis (priests) have lost much of their former influence they are nevertheless generally respected. Many are politically-minded, and their influence may revive and they may become rallying points against Communist control especially in opposition to any Communist-inspired anti-religious activities. Second, there are those Burmans both in and out of the Government who are genuine nationalists, and could probably muster a certain following from a wide variety of political and cultural organizations in opposition to a Communist regime. Third, there are always those opportunistic elements which find it profitably to oppose a ruling authority. Much of the Burma Socialist Party, the majority party in the Burmese Parliament belong to one or the other of the last two groups. The Socialist also control what amounts to a private army. In the event of the ascendance of a Communist Government it is quite likely than an unassessable portion of these forces will defect, to the Communists the remainder going into opposition.

The discussion to this point has assumed that a Communist Government would come to the power in the relatively near future, and with Chinese assistance. However, should a longer view be taken, whereby a situation comparable to that in China is allowed to develop wherein the Communists are able to gradually wear down the Government's will to resist and the people begin to accept Communism as the lesser of two evils, then a different estimate becomes necessary. Under such conditions, most of the foregoing reasoning would still be valid, but the effectiveness and numbers of available resistance groups would be greatly reduced.

In any case, the chances are that Burman groups would be less reliable than the

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ethnic minorities for precisely the same reasons that they would be a detriment to Communist control.

2. Capacity to conduct resistance

a. The Karens

The main Karen forces in the Toungoo area are well organized, and fairly well armed and equipped. Their governmental administration is reported honest, efficient and keeping order. The Karen political organization is the Karen National Union (KNU) which is responsible for overall administration of Karen affairs. Their military forces are known as the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO), which is subordinate to the KNU and relations between the two have so far been harmonious. The Karen military forces in this area number perhaps as many as 25,000 armed men which include former Karen and Kachin military personnel, KNDOs and local armed inhabitants. The force is replete with engineer, signal, sapper and medical corps and possess considerable motor transport. The area is readily defensible, and even if the Karens were to lose their strongholds and their organization seriously disrupted, they could retire deeper into the jungle and mountains from where they could conduct guerrilla warfare almost indefinitely.

In addition, there are an estimated 5,000 armed Karens operating in the Irrawaddy Delta and Tenasserim, who are connected with the KNU and KNDO. These Karens appear to be fragmented into smaller groups and not nearly so well organized and equipped. Furthermore, they are in a more exposed position and would have to withdraw, or be eliminated by a well-coordinated campaign conducted by a strong Government. Nevertheless, under existing circumstances of general confusion they probably will hold their own for some time to come.

Finally, there is a Mon National Defence Organization which is operating in Tenasserim in cooperation with the Karens. The size, organization and

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capabilities of this organization cannot be estimated, but it is probably of little significance.

Logistically, food should not be a decisive factor, although there would be a shortage of salt, meats, oils and other products which are produced in other areas of Burma, or are imported. More arms could undoubtedly be used, and some effort to development standardization would be especially helpful in increasing overall efficiency and effectiveness. Ammunition is a more serious problem. Gasoline and lubricating oils are now in very short supply, as are pharmaceuticals and other medical supplies. As time passes, transport and communications equipment, most of which were formerly the property of the Burmese Government, will deteriorate and obtaining spare parts of all kinds will become a major problem. Another serious deficiency will be the shortage, or absence of textiles.

Military and technical advisors would probably be accepted by the Karens. Such personnel could give the Karens additional hope and inspiration as well as raise the overall effectiveness of Karen forces.

At the present time, the Karens appear capable of maintaining their position for a considerable time. Over a period of time, however, it is bound to deteriorate as a result of logistic deficiencies.

b. Other ethnic minorities

What has been said about the Karens on this matter can be applied to the other frontier peoples. It would be more difficult to supply these groups, and they are not organized to the same degree as are the Karens. On the other hand, the force to be supplied and maintained would be smaller and the area in which they are located is even more defensible than Karen-held territory. The problem of supply would be facilitated in the event of the development of coordination of the activities of the Karens and the other groups.

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**SECRET****3. Burman groups**

Logistic problems for Burman groups would present less of a problem than for the other groups under consideration. Roving lawless bands, living off the country, are common in Burma, and can fairly well support themselves indefinitely. Food would be no problem. By virtue of being Burman they can usually find shelter and can fade into the local population in case of emergency. Arms and ammunition are plentiful in Burma at present and resistance groups could probably keep themselves sufficiently supplied by their own activities. Transportation and communications, and necessary equipment would be kept to a minimum as the chances are that such groups would be acting more or less independently unless there emerged a widely acceptable leader. Therefore, the requirements for equipment for Burman groups, with the exception of arms and ammunition, would be small. The major problem would be psychological, i.e., instilling the will to continue long-term resistance.

**Conclusions to 1 and 2.**

All things considered, it would seem that Burma is a highly suitable area in which to develop resistance and guerrilla activities against a Communist Government. It would appear that such activities would be capable of keeping any such a state of unrest that it would be more a liability than an asset to the Soviet orbit. Among the elements, which may be exploited, the various ethnic minorities who, in the past, have provided the backbone of the local military organizations offer the best opportunities. They not only make excellent professional military personnel, but even better guerrilla material as they are well-versed in jungle-craft. Therefore, such movements would have a nucleus of relatively well-trained and armed military personnel. Furthermore, even now there are both military and political organizations to deal with which provide the ready-made machinery

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Through which assistance can be provided. The KNU and KNDO are the media for approaching the Karens, and the various local chieftains the other minorities. Another advantage is the fact that these people inhabit nearly all the border areas of Burma which is ruggedly mountainous and heavily forested, from which attacks can be launched, haven provided and lines of communications between Communist-controlled areas threatened. Finally, there are likely to be several Burman groups operating against any Communist Government in Lower Burma.

There are, however, two problems concerning the encouragement, development and sustaining of these activities. The first is psychological and entails instilling and maintaining the will to resist, and hope for the future. The second is logistical. Although the groups considered could carry on an anti-Communist program for some time on a self-sustaining basis, sooner or later they will require replenishment of arms and ammunition and other commodities, some of which have already been mentioned. In this respect, the problem of supply should not be too difficult - if Thailand can be used as a base. The forces to be supplied will be relatively small, they are readily accessible, and the machinery for channelling material into Burma, at least to the Karens, is already available either overland or by air drop.

## 2. Existing plans for resistance.

No specific or detailed plans for resistance to a Communist regime are known to exist. As has been noted, the Karens will probably resist any Burman Government, regardless of its ideological complexion, along present lines until such time as they obtain their object of complete or near independence, or until they are defeated and dispersed. As for the other minorities, it is unlikely that any formal plans have been formulated. Nevertheless, many of the local chieftains have held several conferences regarding their relations with the central Government and for gaining greater autonomy. Many of these leaders have also consulted with the Karens. Therefore, although there may not be any

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plan designed specifically for resisting Communist domination, the groundwork appears to have been laid for its development should the contingency arise.

#### 4. Leaders

Karen leadership would continue to be provided by the KNU and KNDO. The president of the KNU and Prime Minister of the Karen rebel Government is Saw Ba U Gyi, a lawyer by profession. Accurate assessment of his capabilities are difficult. However, it can be said that there are no indications of any challenges to his authorities, and that he appears to have established and maintained an administration over Karen affairs which is operating at a higher degree of effectiveness and efficiency than was believed possible. Indications are that Karen leadership consists of a small group of Christian and fairly highly educated Karens who are working with Gyi, and that he is not indispensable as might be the case with Burman leaders. The Karens are by nature clannish, and if Gyi were to be removed, it is probably that one of his advisers would take over without difficulty or serious repercussions. Perhaps Ba U Gyi's greatest fault is over-estimating Karen capabilities and being somewhat fanatic.

Karen military leadership cannot be accurately identified. As in the case of Ba U Gyi, there are a number of possibilities. Among the Karen forces are several officers and men who have been trained by the British and have many years of service, including combat. The former C-in-C of the Burmese Armed Forces is LT. Gen. Smith Dun, a Karen. There are also those who were connected with Force 136 and our own OSS.

Among the other minorities, the only potential leader who can be identified is the Sawbwa (chieftain) of the North Hsenwi Shan State. He has shown considerable independence from the Burmese Government, and recently, with the support of the other Shan Sawbwas, has obtained the position of Special Commissioner for the Shan State. In this capacity he is reported to have increasingly taken admin-

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istrative powers into his own hands, and is now exercising a great deal of autonomy.

No Chin or Kachin leader comparable to the North Hsenwi Sawbwa can be pointed out, but there are undoubtedly many who have the same attitude and once a few were to commence anti-Communist activities, most of the others probably would follow suit.

Among Burmans there are several possibilities, but few probabilities. The Prime Minister, Thakin Nu, is one, but in the event of the formation of a Communist Government he is more likely to acquiesce and retire to a monastery (if not otherwise disposed of) than to offer militant resistance. The same may be said of most of the other elder Burman politicians. There is a possibility that Bo Ne Win (the Deputy Prime Minister, Defense and Home Minister) may be a candidate. He is reportedly developing a cadre of officers in the Burmese Army who owe their position and loyalty to him alone. Should he be ousted from power, it is possible that he may attempt to regain it by force. Ne Win, however, is an opportunist and might attempt to make a deal with the Communists. Since the Burmese press is preponderantly anti-Communists, it is possible that good material may be found among the journalists. Notable among these is Edward Law Yone, the Sino-Burman editor of the NATION, the most outspoken paper in Burma. Law Yone, was extremely active in OSS, and is known to be irrevocably pro-Western.

Some leaders of the Burma Socialist Party such as Kyaw Myeik and Thakin Tin could probably muster considerable following from their party in anti-Communist activities under certain conditions, especially if the country's independence was manifestly compromised. In considering Burman leaders, there is no one man who stands above the others as a widely acceptable leader, and the development of events will have to be awaited before a definite assessment of this nature can be made.

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5. Communist Activities

See ORE 86-49, "Communist Influence in Burma" (to be published shortly.)  
D/VE Staff Study #6, 23 August 1949 of same title; and OIR Report #4725, 12  
November 1948, "Relations Between Burma's Communist Party and the Anti-Fascist  
League."

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13 December 1949

RESISTANCE AND GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS IN THAILAND

Assumption: Established Communist Control. (The assumption is taken to mean, in the case of Thailand, establishment of communist control internally by force, with external assistance, but not by direct attack from China. Under this assumption, the means through which this could come about probably would be the creation of a coalition "united front" Thai government fronting for Chinese and possibly Vietnamese Communists. This set-up to survive would have to be backed by strong armed force, presumably Chinese.)

1. Political and Other Influences.

a. Positive

The widespread veneration and high regard among the Thai for the king as a spiritual head and national figure, and the whole concept of the constitutional monarchy as a governmental institution would influence the formation of a resistance movement. Should it appear that this institution were in danger of being overthrown, the formation of a resistance movement would be facilitated, probably would be backed by a high percentage of the politically articulate Thai and would be sympathetically backed by the peasantry.

A second, but no less important, political influence which would probably affect directly the establishment of a resistance is the traditional Thai apprehension over the threat of Chinese expansion into Thailand. This attitude is conditioned by the presence in Thailand of some three million overseas Chinese whose trade activities and economic power creates for them a firm grip on and an indispensable position in the Thai economy. A Communist attempt to effect significant departures from the present economic, political and social organization of Thailand would alienate not only the political leader level but would develop a hostile peasantry which probably would give aid and comfort to a resistance organization. Furthermore, the Thai generally consider them-

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selves superior to Chinese and would resent any implication or actual fact of Chinese influence in the government of Thailand. This feeling is enhanced by the Thai's great pride in their long record of independence which may also be expected to play an important role in promoting the development of resistance activities. Although the formation of a resistance movement could be expected under these circumstances, it probably would not encompass a very extensive organization.

b. Negative

Possibly offsetting the above factors, the tendency of many Thai to accept fatalistically the seemingly inevitable or an accomplished fact (e.g. Communist control), as well as the Government's desire to remain on friendly terms with all nations would be an influence against the establishment of a widespread resistance movement. Only if the established way of life were seriously interrupted or threatened would the mass of the Thai population become aggressively hostile. Moreover, many Thai politicians believe they can cooperate with and use Communists and at the same time manage to survive as an independent political entity. This attitude has developed out of their past success in <sup>and negoti-</sup> dealing with Western Powers during the establishment of colonial empires while maintaining Thai independence. It is probable that only a relatively limited number of Thai would become actively involved in a resistance movement which could develop in the assumed situation. A goodly number would adopt an opportunistic relationship with the Communist controlled regime.

2. Logistics

Most logistical material for a resistance movement, aside from the present limited military supplies in possession of the Thai armed forces, would have to be imported from external sources. No food and only limited clothing supplies would be necessary. Small arms, communications equipment, and medical supplies would constitute the basic requirements. However, many Thai possess

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Individual weapons and, thus an armed guerrilla movement of short term duration could be organized from currently available personnel and material. The improbability that all military equipment currently in possession of the armed forces could be effectively isolated by a Communist controlled regime would mean that limited supplies of arms and equipment from this source could also be available. Nevertheless, a really effective resistance movement in Thailand would be dependent upon continued access to material from external sources. Given sufficient arms and equipment, available wartime trained Thai (who would join an anti-Communist resistance movement) have the capacity to conduct effective resistance activities.

### 3. Plans

There are no known plans in Thailand for a resistance movement or for "stay behind" activities. It is possible, however, that the Free Thai wartime organization would be used as a blue print for a resistance movement.

### 4. Leaders

Elements directly involved in a resistance movement probably would come from the conservative-royalist career officer ranks, of the Thai armed forces (army, police, navy and air), from the anti-Communist liberals, from certain members of the present anti-Communist governing regime, and possible from diehard remnants of the Kuomintang organization in Thailand. There exist significant numbers of individuals with wartime resistance training to compose an experienced leadership cadre.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to state with any degree of confidence just who would be the leaders of either a resistance movement or stay behind activities. However, the following individuals are listed with some indication as to what their actual role would be in the assumed situation:

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KHUANG APILAIWONG: Parliamentary opposition leader associated with Western concepts of a political party in discipline, organization, and function. He is an able and highly respected political figure who was one of the leaders in the war-time underground and in the Parliamentary revolt which overthrew the then Jap puppet Premier Phibul Songgram. He probably would resist strenuously an effort to change the constitutional monarchy form of government. Possibly would play an important role in "stay behind" activities. He is a former Prime Minister.

SEMI PRAMOJ: A former Prime Minister and overseas representative of the wartime Free Thai movement as Ambassador to US. Very able conservative parliamentarian and supporter of constitutional form of government.

PRIDI BANOMYONG: Leader and prime mover of the wartime Free Thai organization. The logical head of a resistance movement under the assumed situation. Pridi, a man of high integrity, since 1932 has been the leading Thai civilian figure. At present he is in political eclipse.

THANI BUNYAKET: A leader of the Free Thai organization. Probably would fit well in either "stay behind" activities or in a resistance movement.

ADUL ADULDEJ: Very able organization man; as former head of the Thai police and basically non-political in character, he probably would be an effective figure in a resistance movement. Ruthless, reliable and relatively uncorruptible.

SARANUCHIT: Former Army Chief of Staff who showed willingness to take initiative and organize a coup d'etat against the present Phibul regime.

SAMRONG: Able former Army G-2 Chief with wartime underground experience.

5. Present Communist Guerrilla Activities.

There are none.

IP-36

RESISTANCE AND GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS IN INDOCHINA

1. Political Influences

Following the termination of French control in Vietnam, which may possibly take place in 1950, the Republic of Vietnam will establish itself throughout that country as the successor to the French. Those of the Vietnamese leaders who are devoted to the notion that the USSR is the fatherland of democracy and the defender of social justice everywhere, will be faced with the alternatives of attempting to convert Vietnam into a Soviet satellite at once—and perhaps prematurely in view of the unreadiness of the country, in Communist terms, from the economic and ideological standpoints—or of attempting gradually to consolidate their political control, relying chiefly on propaganda and organizational techniques. It is under the first of these alternatives that a resistance movement would tend to appear. If the Indochina war resulted in the establishment of Chinese Communist hegemony over Vietnam, the traditional Sinophobia of the Vietnamese would dispose them all the more toward active resistance. For the purposes of discussing such a movement it will be assumed that a Communist coup will take place shortly after the overthrow of French political control.

The nucleus of the resistance movement in these circumstances will be:

- (1) The Democratic Party (now supporting the Republic);
- (2) Various non-party leaders who have given the Republic their whole-hearted support;
- (3) The native Roman Catholics, lay leaders and clergy;
- (4) The more capable of those Vietnamese who have worked to establish the Bao Dai regime;
- (5) Able Vietnamese who have remained politically neutral in the Indochina war;
- (6) Emigre politicians who had earlier been discredited because of pro-Kuomintang or pro-Japanese leanings.

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Within this hypothetical coalition there exists, at the present time, a sharp cleavage: groups (1) and (2) actively support the Republic, while (4) and (6) oppose it. Group (3) is divided, the majority supporting the Republic. Group (5) remains non-committal. With the end of French domination, however, this cleavage would tend to disappear in favor of a common antipathy to Communist dictatorship. Unity of action among presently pro-Republic, anti-Republic, and neutral groups would no longer be barred by the issue of collaboration with France. It is to be noted, however, that group (3) would probably be partly weakened or liquidated on treason charges.

Whether this coalition would be able to achieve an effective unity of action is problematical. In the broadest terms, this group would represent private property, bourgeois, commercial, religious, pro-Western, interests. The success of this group, as is the case with any political group in Vietnam, would depend on its ability to gain the sympathy of the peasantry, who make up some 90 percent of the population and are the ultimate key to political control in Vietnam. The peasants of Vietnam are naturally conservative as regards land tenure. They would be receptive to a program of lower taxes and rents, better markets, credit facilities, and technical assistance. They would be hostile to collectivist concepts. Unless the coalition could agree upon a mildly "leftist" program such as that described above with respect to the peasantry, it would have little chance of success; undue conservatism such as might be favored by landed interests would be fatal.

In discussing potential resistance elements, the Vietnamese Trotskyists have not been included as a likely member of the coalition since they have little in common with the other groups except anti-Stalinism. The Trotskyists were repressed and driven underground by the Republic, but are reported to be still active, with a membership of perhaps 2,000. A provisional alliance between them and the coalition is not impossible.

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The best organized group within the potential coalition, and the one with the best nationalist record, is the Democratic Party. Its reported membership of 100,000 may be an exaggeration. Reports are that it has the nucleus of a private police force, and that it controls the Ministry of Justice and the Republic down to the local level. The Democratic Party is the natural rallying point of the French-educated intellectuals.

## 2. Logistics

With the possible exception of food, Vietnam does not have the capacity to support underground "stay-behind" groups or any developing resistance movements to a Communist state in the area. Since, however, it is the peasants who must be influenced, outside aid in the form of gratuities to the peasantry might encourage their assistance to some type of organized underground. Cloth has always been in demand in Vietnam, so gifts of this nature might be useful. Medicines, always in short supply in the area, could also be distributed among the peasants in return for aid to the organized resistance.

The resistance groups would be almost powerless without external logistical aid to their cause. Arms and ammunition would naturally rank first in need; second in importance would probably be light communication equipment. What transport was available within the country might be captured from the government in control (assuming that the present resistance government of Ho Chi Minh will have taken over French equipment when French forces either evacuate or are evicted from Vietnam), but motor oils, gasoline, tires, spare mechanical parts, etc. could all be smuggled to clandestine forces. If larger items of transport could reach resistance groups, it would be advisable to include amphibious type vehicles. Medical supplies and essential drugs would be urgently needed and could be run in fairly easily.

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### 3. Plans

To our knowledge there are few plans at the present for any resistance movements should the Stalinist-Communists in the Ho Chi Minh coalition attempt a coup following French eviction. However, there is some information to indicate that a new generation of Trotskyists is said to be developing and working secretly among the laboring classes. Should such a group form a clandestine resistance to a Stalinist-Communist state, however, while it could hardly be expected to be pro-Western, would probably be subject to limited exploitation.

There are, however, certain indications that perhaps two-thirds of the resistance army in South Vietnam is non-Communist and will fight the Communists one-third "when the time comes." One non-Communist leader in this area expressed confidence that if an offensive against the Communists is started, there will be significant desertions to the non-Communist nationalist camp, especially if the latter can afford to pay the troops as well or better than the Communists. Lack of arms and equipment is the chief weakness of this nationalist group of units, making outside aid mandatory in order to attempt independent military action.

### 4. Potential leaders

Bao Dai: At present the Emperor is a symbol of anti-Communism as far as the pro-French non-Communist group is concerned. However, he has led a relatively "soft" life and cannot be considered as having the qualities necessary or the desire to lead a resistance movement.

Nguyen-phan-Long: Bao Dai's Foreign Minister is an experienced newspaperman, used to a fairly influential position among Vietnamese moderates. He is, however, 60 years of age, and within a few years could only be utilized as an advisor to any clandestine movement than as a vigorous leader. His name could be important.

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However, he is known to be an opportunist and might, in a Communist state, accommodate himself to the situation rather than resist it.

Ngo-dinh-Diem: This Catholic-nationalist leader has refused to participate in the Bao Dai experiment because of his well-known anti-French views. With French troops evacuated, however, and his Catholicism finding Communism objectionable he might well be an influential underground leader; first, however, he would need to develop young leaders to assist him in such work, as he also is well past middle age and could take little active part in such a movement. In conjunction with Bishop Le-huu-Tu of the Diocese of Phat Diem (in the southeast part of North Vietnam) an effective resistance to a Communist Vietnamese state might be initiated by him.

Dr. Pham-ngoc-Thach: Has been Undersecretary to the Presidency in the Ho Government since July 1947, usually as a traveling representative. He is not a Communist, and might unite with officials such as Hoang-minh-Giam, Ho's Foreign Minister (a Socialist), Le Hi, also a Socialist and formerly editor of the Vietnam News Service in Bangkok, Pham-van-Bach, reportedly a liberal nationalist and administrative chief of Nambo (South Vietnam) under the resistance government. This group could become the nucleus of a resistance movement against attempted Communist domination when Vietnam is freed of French control. Other supporters might be officials of the Democratic Party as well as the non-partisan cabinet members allegedly a substantial position of the military.

##### 5. Current Communist Guerrilla Activities

See Dept. of State OIR #4909.5 of 1 Aug. 1949, "The Potentials of World Communism: The Far East", Part III: Indochina. Also see Dept. of State OIR #4489 R (2) of 15 Sept. 1949, "The World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations" (parts applicable to Indochina).

Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: 2 Nov 49

To: D/FE, D/WE

Publications

From: ~~Staff Intelligence~~ Division, Projects Planning REL

Subject: Resistance and guerrilla movements in certain countries

Statement of Project

Origin:

Problem: To give the latest available information on resistance and guerrilla movements in each of certain countries

Scope: Countries:

	Burma
	Thailand
Belgium	Malaya
Netherlands	Indo-China

Specific points: as listed in attached memo.

Note that more detail is requested, if available, than in IM-250, which this remotely resembles

Note also that sub.paras. a thru d refer to anti-Soviet

Graphics (if any): resistance movements, and sub-para. e refers to present Communist activities. Sub.paras. a thru d are based on an assumption of communist control of the countries in question; sub-para. e is based on a continuance of Western control.

Form:

Draft due in D/St:

15 December

Dissemination deadline

(if any): 15 December

Responsible Branch: D/FE and D/WE

Internal Coordination: D/FE with D/WE on colonial territories with D/No

Departmental responsibilities: None

Classification to be no higher than: Top Secret

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

NOV 3 1949  
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UNCLASSIFIED		RESTRICTED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
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28 October 1949

**MEMORANDUM FOR:**

**SUBJECT :** Request for Current Intelligence Information on Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Indo-China, Belgium and the Netherlands.

1. This office has an urgent requirement for current intelligence on each of the above mentioned countries to include the following specific points:

a. Political situation, including the attitude of the people, as it might affect the establishment of resistance movements and stay-behind activities.

b. Capacity of the country to support logistically such resistance movements.

c. Existing plans for resistance movements and stay behind activities.

d. Present and potential leaders for resistance movements and stay behind activities.

e. Communist activities of a guerrilla nature within the country at present and their capabilities along such lines in the future, to include feasible communist courses of action.

2. It is further requested that your office prepare a resume or history, of World War II resistance movements in each country.

3. It is requested that the requirement in paragraph 1 be completed by 27 November, and the requirement in paragraph 2 be completed by 24 December 1949.   
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Chief, Special Liaison Section

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*File*  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

21 December 1949


MEMORANDUM FOR: D/Pub, ORE

SUBJECT : IP-36

1. Subject reports have proved to be of great value to OPC, and we are most appreciative of the time and effort which they entailed.

2. Those responsible for their preparation are to be commended for an excellent job.

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Acting Chief, Intelligence Support

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

**FROM:**

ISO

21 December 1949

ACCESSION NO.

DATE RECEIVED IN S. A.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. D/Pub,ORE Mr. [REDACTED] "M"	2316				
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Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100040001-2  
Project: IF-37

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: 4 Nov 49

To: D/Es

From: ~~Staff Intelligence~~ Publications Division, Projects Planning REL

Subject: Phosphates in North Africa

Statement of Project

Origin:

Problem: To provide latest available information on the phosphates resources of North Africa.

Scope: Report should include:

Resources  
Production  
Exports

Especially interested in any information which will indicate export of this material to USSR or Satellites.

Graphics (if any):

Form: D/Es will prepare final draft of memorandum

Draft due in D/St: earliest convenience

Dissemination deadline  
(if any):

Responsible Branch: D/Es

Internal Coordination: D/WE

Departmental responsibilities: None

Classification to be no higher than: Secret

Recommended Dissemination: Restricted only

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ROUTING

25X1A



**SECRET**

28 October 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, G/SI

SUBJECT : Request for Information (Case #521)

1. Request the latest available information on the phosphates resources of North Africa and production and export figures. I am interested in anything which will indicate the export of this material to the Soviet Union or its satellities.

25X1A

Intelligence Support, OPC

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d/psb

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# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

**FROM:** 25X1A 28 October 1949  
 [REDACTED] - 249 South

ACCESSION NO. *A-12118*  
 DATE RECEIVED IN S. A. *31 Oct.*

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
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PHOSPHATES IN NORTH AFRICA

7P-37  
case # 521  
Rec'd 11/22/69

General

Phosphate rock consists principally of calcium phosphate. Apatite, another form of crude phosphate occurring principally in the USSR, contains in addition to calcium phosphate, some calcium fluoride, chloride or carbonate. Both are used chiefly for producing superphosphate for fertilizers. Some phosphate rock and apatite is applied directly to the soil in pulverized form. Phosphate rock and apatite are also raw materials for technical and food grade phosphates. Many of the technical phosphates have important strategic uses but the tonnages for such purposes are relatively small compared with those for agriculture.

Production in North Africa

The three French Dependent Overseas Territories of Algeria, French Morocco, and Tunisia produced 20 percent of world output of phosphate rock in 1940, and have increased their output so that in 1948 the proportion had risen to 34 percent. The US was the leading producer both in 1940 with 37 percent of the total, and in 1948 with 52 percent. The USSR, with its production of apatite, accounted for 23.8 percent of world output of phosphates in 1940 and 21 percent in 1941. Later estimates are not available. No other country produces as much as three percent of world output.

The following table shows production of phosphate rock by the three French Dependent Overseas Territories for 1940 and 1946-48 together with US and world figures for comparison.

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**Phosphate Rock: Production in North Africa, US, and World**

(thousands of metric tons)				
	1940	1946	1947	1948
North Africa				
Algeria	371	585	707	571
Morocco	687	3,784	2,951	3,326
Tunisia	1,187	1,400	1,759	1,864
Total	2,245	5,769	5,427	5,761
United States	4,067	6,971	9,172	8,808
World	10,933	14,673	16,745	16,982

In order to meet the increased requirements of ERP countries for phosphate rock, a program has been prepared to raise North African production to about 8,000,000 metric tons annually by 1952-53. This expansion program will include opening of some new mines, further mechanization of existing operations, and new facilities for concentrating the crushed rock. These latter facilities will include capacity for an additional 800,000 tons of 65-68 percent phosphates per year in place of phosphates of lower content, increased output of Moroccan phosphates of 75-77 percent content, and raising Tunisian output from the 58-63 percent and 63-65 percent grades to a 62-68 percent grade, as well as for a small capacity of 72-75 percent grade.

**Expansion and Marketing Problems**

The planned increase in output and improvement in quality of French North African phosphates will permit the ERP countries to reduce their dollar purchases of phosphate rock. However, execution of the program will require substantial technical skill and financial effort on the part of the mine owners, and to be successful a substantial amount of ERP dollars will be necessary for purchase of some US equipment.

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One of the problems with which OREC has been confronted is to reduce as much as possible dollar purchases of certain commodities when they can be purchased elsewhere, particularly in the participating countries or their dependent overseas territories. US phosphate rock is one of these commodities, and OREC has made some progress in reducing the dollar purchases of it in 1949-50 compared with 1948. However, the French North African rock does not contain as high a phosphate content as US rock, which some countries, notably Italy and Belgium, prefer for the agricultural conditions prevailing in those countries or because North Africa was unable to supply the full quantities desired. The improvement and modernization program scheduled for the North African industry, if fully carried out, may completely solve the problem of dollar purchases of phosphate rock by EKP countries.

#### Reserves

The known reserves of phosphate rock in French Morocco and Tunisia are as follows:

French Morocco	200,000,000 metric tons of high grade. "Inexhaustible" reserves of low grade.
Tunisia	30,000,000 metric tons.

These reserves are those known to be immediately workable without requiring heavy investments. With respect to Tunisia, it has been reported that low grade reserves may run as high as 90,000,000 tons. No information is available on the reserves in Algeria.

#### Exports

The traditional export markets for Algerian, Moroccan, and Tunisian phosphate rock have always been the countries of Western Europe.

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particularly France, the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and Belgium. In 1948 over 75 percent of the combined exports went to Western Europe, and less than one percent to Iron Curtain countries.

The following table shows exports of French Morocco and Tunisia by countries, and total exports of Algeria for 1948. Statistics of Algerian exports by countries are not available but they constitute only 13 percent of the total exports of the three territories.

Phosphate Rock: Exports of French Morocco and Tunisia by Countries and of Algeria (total), 1948

	(thousands of metric tons)			
	French Morocco	Tunisia	Algeria	Total
Western Europe				
Belgium	182	64		246
Denmark	239	3		242
Eire		42		42
France	767	537		1,294
Germany	119	209		328
Greece		28		28
Italy	197	314		511
Netherlands	237	100		337
Portugal	142	33		175
Spain		89		89
Sweden	128			128
Switzerland		2		2
Turkey		4		4
United Kingdom	608	273		881
Total	2,619	1,688		4,307
Eastern Europe				
Czechoslovakia		37		37
Hungary		10		10
Yugoslavia		10		10
Finland		29		29
Total		86		86
Union of South Africa	154			154
All Other	386	120		506
Grand Total	3,159	1,893	671	5,723

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OSRG has reported on imports of phosphate rock by the ERP countries for 1949-50. The schedule for seven of these countries is shown in the following table.

**Phosphate rock: Programmed Imports of Certain ERP Countries  
from Different Areas, 1949-50**

(thousands of metric tons)				
	Participating Countries & Their P.O.T's	US	Other Non- Participating Countries	Total
Belgium	280	50	70	400
France	4,100		900	5,000
Italy	850	150	70	870
Netherlands	605	90		595
Norway	20		40	60
Sweden	240	10	30	280
United Kingdom	<u>1,100</u>	<u>104</u>		<u>1,204</u>
Total	6,895	404	1,110	8,409

It will be noted that the programmed imports of the seven countries from their dependent overseas territories (almost wholly French North Africa) total 6,895,000 tons, compared with production in that area of only 5,761 tons and exports of only 5,717 tons in the calendar year 1948. It is expected that the increase in production in French North Africa will take care of this larger demand.

Western Europe is almost wholly dependent on imports of phosphate rock, including substantial quantities from the US. There is small production of phosphate rock in seven of the countries; also some production of basic slag (a phosphatic material obtained from blast furnaces) in Germany and France is used for fertilizer purposes.

There is no known production of phosphate rock and apatite in any of the satellite countries including Yugoslavia, except for unknown but probably small

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quantities in Rumania. These countries import most of their requirements in the form of apatite, from the USSR, with smaller quantities of phosphate rock from North Africa. In addition they import some superphosphate, principally from Belgium and the Netherlands, but complete data on such imports are not available. Superphosphate has been included in several trade agreements between the satellite countries, and Belgium and the Netherlands.

In the event that the USSR should overrun Western Europe, that area would be cut off from the great bulk of its supplies of phosphate rock. The USSR would not be able to furnish significant quantities of apatite to make up the deficit. Lack of raw materials for manufacture of superphosphate fertilizers would progressively deplete the soil so that in three or four years the crop yields in Western Europe would drop off sharply.

In the case of nitrogen and potash fertilizers (which are much more rapidly leached from the soil than phosphates) crop yields would be quickly reduced if the presently adequate output of these materials were stopped or diverted to other uses, as for example, nitrogen for explosives.

With respect to the USSR itself and the satellite countries, North African phosphate rock has been of no significance to their economies. The USSR has been on an export basis and has supplied the great bulk of the needs of the Satellites as well as their own requirements.

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OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Initiation Memorandum

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Date: 10 Nov 49

To: D/LA

Publications

From: ~~Staff~~ Division, Projects Planning **REL**

Subject: **Christian Democrats organization**

Statement of Project

Origin:

Problem: To provide information on "Christian Democrats" organization in certain countries in South America.

Scope: Information should include:

Size

Strength and numbers

Influence and prestige

Graphics (if any):

Form: Memorandum to be drafted by D/LA

Draft due in D/St: earliest convenience

Dissemination deadline  
(if any):

Responsible Branch: D/LA

Internal Coordination: None

Departmental responsibilities: None

Classification to be no higher than: Secret


Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

**CONFIDENTIAL**

1. Christian Democrats (Latin America)

ROUTING

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

8 November 1949

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : Christian Democrats Organization

REFERENCE : Unclassified State Dispatch, No. 487,  
Montevideo, Uruguay, 22 September 1949

An evaluation of the size, strength, influence, prestige and validity of the "Christian Democrats" organization that includes members and associates in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Peru and Uruguay is requested.

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[REDACTED]  
Chief, Intelligence Research

Reference: Case No. 557

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*ADP*  
*18 Nov*  
**SECRET**

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Chief, D/Pu ATTN: [REDACTED]

17 November 1949

Chief, D/LA

Christian Democrats Organization

REFERENCE: Project IP-38, 10 Nov 49

1. D/LA has some information on subject in addition to that contained in State Department Dsp. Montevideo 487 of 22 Sep 49, which appears to be in the hands of group requesting this project. Specifically nothing is known of this organization in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, or Peru. State Department Dsps. 599, 7 May 47; 652, 19 May 47; and 377, 27 May 48 from Montevideo deal with the organization in Uruguay and Chile and the formation of a regional "Christian-Democrat" organization. Certain details indicate a connection with the Chilean Falange Nacional.
2. The Chilean National Falange Party was organized in 1935 as a youth movement within the Conservative Party. By 1937 it had become a virtually distinct political entity. The party's program embodies the social-Christian doctrines of the Encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII. It supports a leftist ideology. The group is anti-Fascist, and has no connection with the Spanish Falange. Its president is Deputy Tomas REYES Vicuña, and one of its outstanding leaders is Senator Eduardo FREI Montalva, both of whom are active in the regional Christian Democrats organization.
3. Foundations for the formation of the regional organization were laid in Montevideo in April 47 at a meeting of Catholic political leaders from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. According to El Bien Público, Uruguayan Catholic newspaper, the purpose of the organization is "to promote, by means of study and action, the establishment of political, economic, and cultural democracy, based on principles of Christian humanism, by means which respect liberty, human dignity, and the community spirit and to combat the increasing totalitarian dangers of neo-fascism, communism, and reactionary capitalism". It further states that the movement is not confined to Catholics and may be joined by all who subscribe to its principles.
4. Any further report on this organization would involve search of biographical files and probably requests for field reporting; it would involve considerable time both accumulating data here and waiting for field reports. Therefore, the matter will not be carried further unless we are informed that originator of project attaches considerable importance to this matter and desires us to proceed further.

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Project Initiation MemorandumDate: **15 Nov 49**To: **D/WE****Publications**From: ~~State Intelligence~~ Division, Projects PlanningSubject: **Austria**Statement of ProjectOrigin:Problem: To provide information requestedScope: Note that estimates are requested as to


- (a) Dependence of Austrian economy on foreign aid;
- (b) Possible USSR control over Austria.

Graphics (if any):Form: Memorandum, to be prepared in final draft by D/WEDraft due in D/St: earliest convenience(if any):Responsible Branch: **D/WE**Internal Coordination: **D/EE**Departmental responsibilities: **None**Classification to be no higher than: **Secret**Recommended Dissemination: **Requester only****CONFIDENTIAL**

1. Austria - Economics
2. Austria - For. pol. - USSR
3. USSR - For. pol. - Austria

ROUTING

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

14 November 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, G/SI

SUBJECT : Request for Intelligence Information  
on Austria

1. It is requested that this office be provided with the following intelligence information on Austria.

a. Estimates of extent and nature of the dependence of the Austrian economy on foreign aid now and during the next few years, particularly after the E.C.A. program comes to an end.

b. Estimates of the degree of control which the USSR might be able to exercise over the Austrian economy and/or the Austrian Government as a result of possible concessions made under an Austrian peace treaty.

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Intelligence Support Officer

**CONFIDENTIAL**

12 January 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT : Soviet Economic Capabilities in post-Treaty Austria

REFERENCE: DCI Directive 3/1 dated 8 July 1948

1. Problem

To estimate Soviet economic capabilities in Austria under post-treaty conditions.

2. Scope

On the basis of an analysis of Soviet economic operations and holdings in Austria which would provide a basis for continued Soviet economic influence in post-treaty Austria, it is intended to estimate the degree to which the USSR will be able to influence the Austrian economy after the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace.

3. Deadlines

It is intended to have an ORE draft by 15 April 1950.

4. Departmental Action Required.

a. The Office of Intelligence Research of the Department of State is invited to make the analysis of Soviet economic holdings and the economic implications of the proposed treaty. OIR is requested to prepare and forward an outline of the proposed analysis by 26 January 1950.

b. A meeting to discuss this outline will be held on 1 February 1950 at 1400 in Room 1517, Temporary "M" Building. [REDACTED] 25X1A  
[REDACTED] (Room 2427 Temporary "M" Building, Code 143, Extension 2894) has been designated the ORE representative for this project.

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c. It is requested that a corresponding OIR representative be designated in writing.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

/s/  
THEODORE BABBITT  
Assistant Director  
Reports and Estimates

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STANDARD FORM 64

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*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Publications Division, ORE

DATE: 10 January 1950

FROM : Chief, Western Europe Division, ORE

SUBJECT: Request to OIR for Analysis Relative to IP-39

1. In order to comply with the terms of reference of IP-39 D/WE is required to estimate Soviet economic capabilities in Austria under post-treaty conditions. In order to make this estimate D/WE needs analyses of the extent of probable Soviet economic influence in Austria following a treaty.

2. In recognition of the facilities of OIR of the Department of State, for such research and analysis, it is requested that OIR be invited to make the necessary studies.

3. In order to complete the D/WE estimate by 15 April 1950, it is requested that OIR prepare and submit an outline of its proposed analyses to D/WE by 26 January 1950, and that representatives of OIR meet with representatives of D/WE to discuss the outline on 1 February. It is desired to have the completed OIR study by 25 March 1950.

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4. [REDACTED] (Room 2427 M, Code 143, Extension 2894) has been designated D/WE representative for this project. The name of a corresponding representative of OIR should be designated to her in writing.

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[REDACTED] will be prepared to deal directly with the OIR representative on all matters of substance. It is requested, however, that all arrangements for meetings or other administrative detail be handled by D/Pub.

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Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100040001-2